As Bangladesh prepares to hold its first national election since the dramatic fall of Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing government in 2024, the country’s neighbours are watching closely. Beyond domestic debates about jobs, governance, and democracy, this election is also a moment of regional reassessment. Bangladesh’s foreign policy, especially towards its neighbours, has become a key issue in the campaign, and this reflects deeper shifts in how neighbouring states view the outcome of the polls.
The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has unveiled an election manifesto that blends a promise of democratic reform at home with a tougher stance on some longstanding foreign policy concerns. The manifesto commits to upholding the dignity of the vote and ensuring that no one is above the law, signalling a pledge to accountable governance if the BNP comes to power. At the same time, it lays out a more assertive foreign policy, one that places national interest at the centre and, in particular, highlights issues that have long strained relations with Bangladesh’s immediate neighbour. Prominent among these concerns are border security and the unresolved sharing of river water resources. The BNP’s pledge to take a strict position on border killings, alleged push-ins, and smuggling points directly to issues that have at times made relations along the Bangladesh-India frontier tense in the past and remain sensitive today. This tough language on issues that touch everyday lives speaks to national sentiment and a desire to assert Bangladesh’s sovereignty more forcefully than in recent years.
Bangladesh and India share a long and complex relationship, rooted in history. India played a decisive role in Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, and the two countries have maintained extensive economic and strategic ties for decades. In normal times, India has been Bangladesh’s largest trading partner in Asia, with deep cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, security, and counter-terrorism. However, occasional border fatalities involving India’s Border Security Force and disputes over the sharing of water from rivers such as the Teesta and Padma have periodically caused friction, contributing to distrust and popular frustration in Bangladesh. Managing such issues requires balancing national sentiments with practical cooperation, and the BNP manifesto’s focus on these topics reflects both domestic pressures and a broader desire to redefine Bangladesh’s approach to its neighbours.
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India’s interest in the outcome of the Bangladesh election is understandable, given the size of the border they share and the depth of economic interdependence between the two countries. Delhi has repeatedly emphasised that it wants elections in Bangladesh to be inclusive and participatory, and senior Indian leaders have publicly wished Bangladesh well as the polls approach. At the same time, Indian officials are likely watching the rise of other political actors with varying degrees of scepticism. India would naturally prefer a stable government in Dhaka that can work constructively on shared challenges like border management, water sharing, and regional connectivity. New Delhi’s stance reflects a cautious hope that whichever government comes to power will uphold stability, engage India as a partner, and avoid policies that could heighten tensions or disrupt the longstanding cooperative relationship.
passenger train was set on fire in Dhaka ahead of elections ANI At the same time, Bangladesh’s foreign policy debate cannot be viewed only through the prism of Bangladesh-India relations. Pakistan and China are also reassessing their engagement with Bangladesh. Pakistan’s ties with Bangladesh have reportedly warmed since the overthrow of the previous government, with renewed diplomatic and trade interactions that had been limited for decades. For Islamabad, a government in Dhaka that is open to defence and cultural diplomacy could serve its strategic interests, especially in a region where historical legacies and shifting alliances matter. China, for its part, has been active in meeting with leaders from all major parties ahead of the Bangladesh polls, signalling a consistent interest in maintaining and deepening bilateral cooperation. Beijing’s focus is likely to remain economic and strategic, centred on infrastructure investment, trade, and regional connectivity, regardless of which political party emerges victorious. This reflects China’s broader approach to South Asia, where it seeks influence through economic partnerships and pragmatic engagement rather than explicit political alignment.
The issue of India’s role in Bangladesh’s internal affairs has become more sensitive in recent months, particularly around the continued presence of Sheikh Hasina in India since her departure in 2024. BNP leaders have used this situation to frame arguments about sovereignty and justice, urging that Hasina should be returned to face legal processes in Bangladesh. Such rhetoric taps into broader nationalist sentiments and reflects a generational shift in how Bangladesh’s political class engages with its neighbours, especially when it comes to perceived interference or influence. At the same time, many analysts believe that realpolitik will eventually shape Dhaka’s foreign policy once a new government takes office. Even parties that campaign on assertive positions are likely to recognise the importance of relations with large neighbours like India for trade, economic cooperation, and security in a world where regional stability is closely linked to economic development.
Regional stakes and shifting alliances
The broader context matters because South Asia is a region of overlapping interests, historic grievances, and shifting alliances. Bangladesh’s internal politics have always influenced how it relates to its neighbours, and vice versa. Past periods of strong bilateral cooperation have shown that effective diplomacy can push forward agreements on trade, security, and connectivity. However, when political rhetoric becomes heated and national sentiment is invoked around border incidents or water disputes, the relationship can become strained. The election, therefore, is not just about who governs Bangladesh; it is also about how Dhaka defines its role within a complex regional neighbourhood where India, Pakistan, and China each have distinct interests.
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What this means for Bangladesh’s neighbours is that they are likely to remain engaged but cautious. Foreign capitals will watch not only the election result but also the tone of diplomacy that emerges from Dhaka in the weeks and months that follow. Pragmatism will be essential. Even if tough language about borders and rivers resonates domestically, neighbours will be alert to how such positions translate into actual policy once the polls are over. An assertive foreign policy posture need not be confrontational if it is rooted in genuine negotiation and mutual respect. The election itself represents a moment of opportunity not only for Bangladesh’s domestic politics, but also for its neighbours to begin a new chapter of cooperation based on shared interests and regional stability.
In the end, Bangladesh’s election is a reminder that domestic politics and regional diplomacy are inseparable. As the country casts its votes, neighbouring capitals will be calculating, responding, and preparing for shifts that may follow. What remains clear is that the quality of relations between Bangladesh and its neighbours in the coming years will be shaped by how political leadership in Dhaka balances nationalist aspirations with the realities of interconnected regional dynamics.
About the Author:
Atendriya Dana, Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University
